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EIMCO PROCESS EQUIPMENT CO., ] 
SECOND INJURY FUND and 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Respondents. , 
Case No. 20914 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
EIMCO PROCESS EQUIPMENT CO, 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Respondent concurs with the statement as recited 
in petitioner's (Applicant's) brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent concurs generally in the Statement of Facts 
as recited in the brief of applicant but offers some comments for 
clarity. 
According to applicant's own testimony (R 156-165) and 
the summary by Dr. Noehrens (R 118) applicant has had a wide 
variety of work and other experiences. These include taking 
several courses at technical schools, construction work, owning 
and operating a farm for about ten years, owning and operating a 
blacksmith business for eight to ten years, spending about a year 
abroad on a project study, performing a variety of duties while 
working forat least twelve years with several employers other 
than respondent Eimco, and performing a variety of tasks while 
1 
working five years and two months with Eimco. 
The statements appearing at the top of page 4 of Appli-
cant's brief concerning applicant's "intent" relative to voluntary 
retirement or termination may be ambiguous. The fact is that 
applicant retired and does not assert that respondent or anyone 
else forced him to retire or terminate involuntarily. 
In reversing the Administrative Law Judge the Industrial 
Commission, after setting aside the Administrative Law Judge's 
interpretation of Marshall v The Industrial Commission/ 681 P2d 
208 (Utah 1984), based its action on several findings, including 
a finding that applicant had not met his burden of showing 
inability to work. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Applicant is not permanently totally disabled and 
is not entitled to benefits under U.C.A., 1953 35-1-67. 
II. The decision in Marshall v The Industrial 
Commission, 681 P2d 208 (Utah 1984) does not mandate a finding 
for applicant. 
III. The findings and order of the Industrial Commis-
sion reversing the Administrative Law Judge are not "arbitrary 
and capricious", "wholly without cause", "contrary to the one 
(inevitable) conclusion from the evidence", or "without any substantial 
evidence to support them." 
IV. The Industrial Commission of Utah did not commit 
any error of law. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONER IS NOT PERMANENTLY TOTALLY DISABLED 
AND IS NOT ENTITLED TO BENEFITS UNDER U.C.A., 
1953, 35-1-67 
To qualify for benefits under U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-67, 
an applicant must show two things: That because of industrial 
impairment he is disabled from performing the general duties of 
his work; and that he is not a good candidate for rehabilitation. 
In the instant case, Rehabilitation Services found 
that applicant was not a good candidate for rehabilitation (R 
217). However, this does not establish that applicant is 
disabled, only that he would not be a good candidate for 
retraining in a new occupation. A finding that would apply to 
many, if not most, people aged sixty-five. 
Applicant has failed to establish that he is disabled 
from performing the duties of his job. In this connection, the 
findings of the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
Commission are specific and relevant. In his Findings, Conclu-
sions and Order (R 218-224), the Administrative Law Judge stated: 
"The Applicant worked effectively before the 
December 1982 injury despite his 27% pre-existing 
impairment which included such things as hearing 
loss. The December 1982 incident only added a 10% 
impairment. The Applicant was able to work 
effectively in his job for about a year after his 
injuries healed. There is no evidence of a new 
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injury, nor is there any medical evidence that the 
Applicant was taken off the job April 28, 1984, 
because of his old injuries. The Applicant just 
plain retired."(R 222) 
The Administrative Law Judge presided at both hearings, 
had all exhibits, heard all testimony,and even questioned 
applicant concerning his ability to work. On one occasion, in 
response to questions by the Administrative Law Judge, applicant 
admitted that he had never turned down jobs at work. (R 82) 
There was a hearing on October 17, 1983, after applicant had 
returned to work and one on September 25, 1984, after he had 
retired. After all of this, the Administrative Law Judge was 
still of the opinion that applicant had "just plain retired." 
The facts in this case are compelling. After treatment 
and release by the doctor, applicant returned to work and worked 
almost a year until voluntary retirement. There were no new 
injuries.There are no medical opinions or other medical evicence 
that he was totally disabled. There is no medical evidence that 
his injuries took him off the job. He has made no allegations 
that he advised his employer on the job that his physical 
condition had changed and he could no longer work at what he was 
doing. He just worked until he became 65 and retired the next 
day. 
The Administrative Law Judge did not at any time make a 
specific separate finding based on evidence that applicant was 
permanently and totally disabled. He did not even make a preli-
minary finding of total disability prior to referring applicant 
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for rehabilitation evaluation. (R 216-217) His only finding of 
disability was based solely on the so-called 'mandate1. 
Dr. Holbrook, head of the medical panel that examined 
applicant, declined to state that applicant was disabled, (R 149) 
and he made no recommendations against future work. 
The Medical Panel Findings are set forth in a report 
dated February 1, 1984 by Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, M.D. (R 179-187) 
and are summarized in the Order of The Industrial Commission (R 
238-243). The findings disclose an array of ailments, including 
such things as hearing loss (5%), non-industrial cervical spine 
degeneration (10%), sore right ankle (rated at 7% of whole man 
due primarily to pain) etc. The medical report itself is over 
eight pages long and it refers to reports from other physicians. 
Nowhere in the Medical Panel report or related 
documents is there any statement that applicant is disabled from 
work or can anticipate becoming disabled because of the injury or 
otherwise. On page five of the report (R 182), referring to his 
discussions with applicant, Dr. Holbrook wrote: 
"(5) The low back. He has made a good recovery from 
the low back surgery as indicated at the hearing and in 
the medical records. He does still get some numbness 
and tingling in the right lower extremity particularly 
with lifting or walking for long periods of time. He 
has returned to work but is working more as a helper. 
He planned on continuing to work beyond age 65 but now 
is afraid that he might get hurt because of his lack of 
dexerity because of the other problems that he has. He 
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con t inues to note some so reness in the low back as we l l 
as some s t i f f n e s s . He fee ls tha t the condition of the 
back i s q u i t e we l l s t a b i l i z e d a t the p r e s e n t r ime." 
(Emphasis added.) 
In the same report the Medical Panel expressed the 
specific conclusion that the industrial injury did not aggravate 
the pre-existing impaired condition of the applicant (R 186) 
So there was a situation where the applicant was 
employed and working, but carefully considering whether he would 
be comfortable working beyond his sixty-fifth birthday, which was 
then about six months away. He did not even consider ability to 
work, but only whether he might get hurt on account of his pre-
existing impairment. He did not say he.was disabled or might 
suddenly become disabled on his 65th birthday; only that he might 
get hurt after he became 65. Also, he did not blame his lack of 
dexterity, (the potential cause of injury) on the industrial 
injury, but on the pre-existing impairments, may of which were 
simply ailments incident to living and aging. 
The medical report of February 1, 1984 is based on an 
examination of applicant on November 15, 1983, and the then 
existing medical records. There is no medical evidence of any 
sort pertaining to applicant's physical condition since the panel 
report of February 1, 1984, so there is no medical evidence 
available to show why applicant became disabled on the day he 
retired—one day after his 65th birthday. 
In order to qualify for benefits for permanent total 
disability under U.C.A., 1953, Sec. 35-1-67, an applicant must show 
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that because of his industrial injury he can no longer perform 
work of the same general character he was doing when injured or 
any other work which a man of his capabilities may be able to do 
or learn to do, Entwistle v Wilkins, 626 P2d 495 (Utah 1981). 
Applicant has not shown by substantial evidence that he is so 
disabled. 
In cases where applicant relies on pain to show 
disability and there is no medical evidence, the burden to show 
disability is a heavy one, especially when applicant worked. 
Hollis v Travelers Ins. Co. 368 So2d 154 (La. App. 1978); 2 
Larson's Workmenfs Compensation Section 57.21. 
On the entire record The Industrial Commission made the 
specific finding that applicant had not met his burden showing his 
inability to return to work. Respondent submits that this is a 
proper finding. 
As noted above, the Administrative Law Judge did not 
actually make a separate finding that applicant was disabled. 
However, had he done so, it would make no difference because 
there is conflicting evidence here between applicant's testimony 
that he is unable to work and the facts that he could and did 
work and that there is no medical evidence that he was disabled or 
that his condition changed. Whenever conflicting evidence exists, 
The Industrial Commission may disregard the finding of the Adminis-
trative Law Judge and make its own findings of fact U.S.Steel v 
Industrial Commission 607 P2d 807 (Utah 1980). 
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II. THE DECISION IN MARSHALL V. INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION 687 P2D 208 UTAH 208 DOES NOT 
MANDATE A FINDING FOR APPLICANT 
In spite of his own findings and "with great reluc-
tance" the Administrative Law Judge found that, "under present 
case holdings", the applicant was totally and permanently 
disabled. By the words "present case holdings", the Administra-
tive Law Judge was referring to Marshall v Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 681 P2d 208 (Utah 1984). He stated his belief 
that that case mandated such a finding and that applicant was 
accordingly entitled to benefits. The Administrative Law Judge 
was not specific as to what gave rise to the mandate. It is 
probable he was referring to the relative percentage impairment 
in the two cases. In Marshall, the defendants denied liability 
on the grounds that impairment was only 26% and that was insuffi-
cient for a determination of total disability, and that the sole 
reason for applicant's retirement was age. This Court found that 
the Industrial Commission was in error in resting its award on 
the percentage of impairment and on the fact the applicant was 
eligible to retire rather than on his ability to work. 
Regardless of why the Administrative Law Judge believed 
he was mandated by Marshall, 681 P2d 208, that case differs 
markedly from the case at bar. 
In Marshall 681 P2d 208, because of the industrial 
injury and the recommendation of his doctors, applicant was 
prevented from returning to work in the mines where he had been 
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employed forty years. At the time of the injury applicant was 67 
years old and eligible to retire, but had not done so. 
In contrast, in the instant case, applicant was 
injured, returned to work, was later surgically treated, returned 
to work again and continued to work until he became eligible to 
and did in fact retire. The differences between the instant case 
and Marshall 681 P2d 208 are important. In Marshall, 681 P2d 208 
there was no evidence that applicant had any ability to work. 
In the instant case, it is clear, applicant was able to work 
because he did. He may not have been as vigorous as in earlier 
days, but he could and did work. 
Applicant was told by the treating physician to take it 
easy. (R 77) Apparently he did so because he testified that he 
couldn't do everything he had previously done. But the fact is he 
performed work of the same general character that he performed 
prior to his injury. Applicant's testimony does not establish 
that he couldn't work at his old job. He says only that he 
couldn't do everything he wanted to in the way he was used to 
doing it and, as he told Dr. Hollbrook, his lack of dexterity is 
due to other problems (R 182). As a practical matter, applicant 
was describing the effects of aging as it happens to everyone. It 
does not mean a person is totally disabled. 
There are other circumstances in this case mitigating 
against a finding of permanent total disability. Applicant was 
not the run of the mill one-employer factory worker. He had been 
in a lot of jobs and had a lot of experiences as noted in his own 
testimony (R 156-165) and the summary by Dr. Hoehren (R 118). He 
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would normally be more adaptable and resourceful on the job. In 
fact, given his experience and background, it is doubtful that 
applicant is truly within the odd-lot doctrine. Or, if he is, he 
has a bigger burden, in view of his wide background, to establish 
that work is not available before the burden shifts to the 
employer. Metzger v. Chemetron Corp. 687 P2d 1033 (Mont 1984). 
Although the Administrative Law Judge awarded applicant 
permanent total disability benefits, he did so solely on the 
belief that Marshall, 681 P2d 208 mandated such action. The 
Industrial Commission reversed. The reversal was not solely 
because the Administrative Law Judge had misinterpreted Marshall. 
Rather, it was because a review of the entire file convinced the 
Commission that applicant was not permanently totally disabled. 
The Commission said, "Upon review of the file and the Administra-
tive Law Judge's Orders, the Commission is of the opinion that 
the case does not warrant an award of permanent total disability 
benefits." The Commission summarized its review of the file, 
distinguished the instant case from Marshall 601 P2d 208 and 
concluded (R 238) that, "The facts of this case do not show that 
the applicant has met his burden in showing inability to return 
to work as is required by Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-
69."(sic) (R 239) 
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III. THE FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
REVERSING THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ARE NOT 
"ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS", "WHOLLY WITHOUT CAUSE" 
"CONTRARY TO THE ONE (INEVITABLE) CONCLUSION FROM 
THE EVIDENCE", OR "WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT THEM." 
This Court has a stringent standard of review in 
Industrial Commission cases. This standard was most recently 
reiterated in Kerans v The Industrial Commission of Utah, 
25 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Jan 3 1986) wherein at page 44, citing 
Oqden Standard Examiner v Industrial Commission 663 P2d 88 (Utah 
1983), this court said: "(our inquiry is) whether the Commis-
sion's findings are 'arbitrary and capricious,' or 'wholly 
without cause', or contrary to the 'one (inevitable) conclusion 
from the evidence' or without 'any substantial evidence' to 
support them. Only then should the Commission's findings be 
displaced." 
In Kerans 25 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, several issues 
were involved. This Court's standard of review was specifically 
applied to affirm the Commission's refusal to enter a finding of 
permanent total disability which would have entitled applicant to 
benefits under U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-67. In its decision, at page 
46, this Court stated: 
"The question of whether plaintiff was totally and 
permanently disabled was one of fact to be decided by 
the Commision, upon all the evidence in the case. In 
light of our stringent standard of review of such 
11 
questions, and in recognition of the facts and the 
evidence cited as the basis for the Commission's 
finding, we decline to disturb that finding." 
It is submitted that in the instant case, there is no 
basis for holding that the Commission's findings are 'arbitrary 
and capricious. ' The Commission reviewed the record and reported 
on that review (R 238-242). Except for the finding of total 
disability, which the Administrative Law Judge believed was 
mandated, the Industrial Commission concurred with most of the 
Administrative Law Judge's relevant findings. Specifically, the 
Commission noted that the Applicant went back to work, he did not 
leave work because of old or new injuries, but "just plain 
retired". It also made its own finding that the applicant had 
not met his burden of inability to return to work. 
There is no basis for finding that the Commission's 
findings were 'wholly without cause.' The Commission had all the 
evidence in the file, including the medical reports discussed 
above, as a basis to conclude that applicant was not permanently 
totally disabled. 
Furthermore, the Commission's findings are not 'contrary 
to the one (inevitable) conclusion from the evidence.' Clearly 
the conclusion sought by applicant is not the only one possible 
from the evidence. The fact is that after treatment, applicant 
returned to work and worked for almost a year, then retired. 
Surely that does not lead only to a conclusion that applicant is 
totally disabled! 
And, finally, it cannot be said that the Commission's 
l 9 
Order and findings are without any substantial evidence to 
support them. The Commission reviewed the same record as did the 
Administrative Law Judge. Except for the allegedly "mandated11 
finding of permanent total disability, it did not upset any of 
the Administrative Law Judge's findings. On the contrary, it 
essentially made the same findings with respect to applicant's 
ability to work and found accordingly that applicant did not prove 
that he was permanently and totally disabled. 
Applicant has implied on page 4 of his brief that he* 
was forced by respondent to retire. No evidence whatsoever was 
presented to that effect. This is consistent with the finding by 
the Industrial Commission that applicant was not disabled but 
just retired. There is ample evidence to show that applicant was 
not disabled. This includes the fact that applicant worked. It 
also includes a lack of medical evidence that he was disabled. 
It further includes statements by applicant that he is concerned 
about problems other than the industrial injury but was still 
thinking about working past 65. (Supra pp 5-6) In short, there 
is ample support for the finding that applicant was not perman-
ently totally disabled. 
In view of the foregoing, it is submitted that the 
instant case is one in which the Order appealed from should not 
be disturbed because it falls clearly within the situation stated 
in Kerans 25 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 where at page 46 this Court said: 
"The question of whether plaintiff was totally and 
permanently disabled was one of fact to be decided by 
the Commission, upon all of the evidence in the case. 
13 
In light of our stringent standard of review of such 
questions, and in recognition of the facts and the 
evidence cited as the basis for the Commission's 
finding, we declined to disturb that finding." 
The Court's decision in Entwistle Co. v Wilkins, Utah 
626 P2d 495, is applicable to the instant case. In Entwistle the 
employer and carrier sought reversal of an Order by the 
Industrial Commission awarding temporary total compensation for a 
period during which the applicant worked for another employer. 
The Order was affirmed. This Court said, at page 498, that in 
considering the attack upon the order, it applies the principles 
established in such matters and that, "We review the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the Commission's findings, and when 
there is substantial evidence to support the facts found by the 
Commission, its order will not be disturbed." 
In the present case, the key finding is that applicant 
did not show that he was totally disabled. There is substantial 
evidence to support that finding in that, inter alia, applicant 
worked almost a year, retired voluntarily, and there is nothing 
in any medical report indicating total disability, or for that 
matter, any significant disability at all. 
IV. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH DID NOT COMMIT 
ANY ERROR OF LAW IN REVERSING THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW JUDGE 
The Industrial Commission's Order reversing the 
Administrative Law Judge and denying Applicant benefits for 
permanent total disability under U.C.A., 1953 35-1-67 is proper, 
l A 
consistent with and not contrary to law and does not deny 
applicant due process of law. 
In the instant case the Applicant was injured, was 
treated and, after healing, returned to work. He continued to 
work until his sixty-fifth birthday, whereupon he retired. The 
evidence shows, and the Administrative Law Judge did not believe 
Applicant was disabled from work stating that: 
"The Applicant worked effectively before the 
December 1982 injury despite his 27% pre-existing 
impairment which included such things as hearing 
loss. The December 1982 incident only added a 10% 
impairment. The Applicant was able to work effectively 
in his job for about a year after his injuries healed. 
There is no evidence of a new injury, nor is there any 
medical evidence that the Applicant was taken off the 
job April 28, 1984, because of his old injuries. The 
Applicant just plain retired." (R 222) 
Nevertheless, the Administrative Law Judge awarded 
Applicant long term disability benefits in the belief that the 
ruling of this Court in Marshall 681 P2d 208 mandated such an 
award. The Industrial Commission reversed, finding, inter alia, 
that "The facts in this case do not show that the Applicant has 
met his burden in showing inability to return to work as is 
required by Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-69 (sic)" 
In order to establish a prima facie case for permanent 
total disability under the odd-lot doctrine as stated in 
Marshall, 681 P2d 208, the applicant must establish (1) That 
because of his i n d u s t r i a l impairment he i s no longer capable of 
performing the gene ra l d u t i e s of h i s former work, and (2) That 
the a p p l i c a n t cannot be r e h a b i l i t a t e d . Only when t h i s i s done, 
does the burden sh i f t to the employer to show tha t regular work 
i s ava i l ab le . As noted supra page 10, when, as here, appl ican t ' s 
background shows a capacity for doing a va r ie ty of t a sks , he has 
to show more than i f he was of l i m i t e d expe r i ence . He may have 
to demonstrate f i r s t t ha t there i s no work ava i lab le before the 
burden s h i f t s . Metzger v Chemetron 687 P2d 1033 (Mont. 1984) 
(Supra page 10). 
In the i n s t an t case, the second element i s es tab l i shed . 
However, a p p l i c a n t has not met h i s burden of proof on the f i r s t 
e lement because he did not prove by s u b s t a n t i a l ev idence t h a t 
b e c a u s e of h i s i n d u s t r i a l i m p a i r m e n t he i s i n c a p a b l e of 
performing the general dut ies of h is former work. 
There i s ano the r f a c t o r . Assuming arguendo t h a t a 
prima facie case was made, respondent employer has in fact 
met i t s r e su l t ing burden because i t had made employment 
a v a i l a b l e which a p p l i c a n t was ab le t o and did perform u n t i l he 
v o l u n t a r i l y t e r m i n a t e d . In 2 Larson 's Workmen's Compensation, 
Sec t ion 57.51, i t i s sa id t h a t proof of work of ten becomes a 
c e n t r a l i s s u e to which t h e r e i s no s imple yes -or -no answer. 
I t i s s u b m i t t e d t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e say t h e work was 
ava i lab le because appl icant had a job he did perform. 
Respondent d i sagrees with appl ican t ' s statement tha t 
t he Commission r eve r sed the A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law Judge s o l e l y 
because of h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Marsha l l 681 P2d 208. The 
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Commission held that the Administrative Law Judge was not 
"mandated" by the Marshall case to hold as he did. Then, in 
addition, the Commission distinguished the Marshall case and 
found further, that the applicant had not met his burden of 
showing inability to return to work (R 239). 
Respondent does not claim that an employee is forever 
barred from benefits under U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-67 simply because 
he returns to work. Respondent does, however, assert that whether 
or not the employee ever returns to work, he must establish 
that he is permanently and totally disabled to be eligible for 
benefits under U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-67. In the case at bar, 
applicant has not done so. His return to work and long term 
continuation at work, plus all the other factors including the 
extensive medical report which do not contain support for a 
claim of disability, are convincing that applicant was not 
totally disabled. The Commission made a specific finding that 
applicant had no shown he was disabled. 
The Industrial Commission had before it the entire 
record of the case. This included all medical records of the 
case, correspondence, exhibits, and testimony. The Commission 
has a duty to decide questions of fact. It does so on all the 
evidence. It must determine the weight, credibility and meaning 
of the evidence in light of all the circumstances. There is no 
showing at all that the Commission ignored any evidence. 
There is conflicting evidence here. Applicant wants us 
to believe he is totally disabled, but the medical records 
contain no real support for that, and he did work for a long 
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t i m e . P e r h a p s n o t d o i n g e v e r y t h i n g , b u t w o r k i n g . When, a s h e r e , 
t h e r e i s c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e , t h e Commiss ion may d i s r e g a r d t h e 
f i n d i n g of t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law Judge and make i t s own f i n d i n g s 
of f a c t . U . S . S t e e l v . I n d u s t r i a l C o m m i s s i o n 607 P2d 807 (Utah 
1 9 8 0 ) . 
I t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t b e c a u s e t h e a p p l i c a n t f a i l e d t o 
d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t he was p e r m a n e n t l y d i s a b l e d from h i s j o b , t h e r e 
was no b u r d e n on r e s p o n d e n t , b u t e v e n i f t h e r e w a s , i t h a s b e e n 
m e t . 
From t h e f o r e g o i n g i t i s b e l i e v e d a p l p a r e n t , t h e r e ha s 
been no d e n i a l of due p r o c e s s o r o t h e r a c t i o n c o n t r a r y t o l a w . 
CONCLUSION 
1. The a p p l i c a n t i s not permanent ly and t o t a l l y 
disabled, and i s not e l i g i b l e for benef i t s under U.C.A., 1953, 
35-1-67. 
2. For the reasons r e i t e r a t e d by t h i s Court in Sam 
Joe Kerans v The I n d u s t r i a l Commission of Utah, 25 Utah Adv. Rep. 
42 (Jan 3, 1986); because the f i n d i n g s and Order of the Indus -
t r i a l Commission reversing the Administrat ive Law Judgefs Findings 
of F a c t , C o n c l u s i o n s of Law and Order a r e no t a r b i t r a r y or 
c a p r i c i o u s , or wholly wi thout cause , or c o n t r a r y to the one 
( i n e v i t a b l e ) c o n c l u s i o n from t h e e v i d e n c e , or w i t h o u t any 
s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t hem, bu t a r e s u p p o r t e d by 
subs t an t i a l evidence and are not incons is ten t with law, the Order of 
the Indus t r i a l Commission should not be dis turbed. 
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Wherefore, respondent respectfully requests that the Order 
of the Industrial Commission reversing the Administrative Law 
Judge be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /ft day of April, 1986. 
Robert R. Finch 
4322 Vallejo Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
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Eimco Process Equipment Co. 
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